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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Conrad Petersen's 
motion to suppress evidence. The district court found the officers performed an 
unjustified, warrantless search of the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's car. 
The State also challenges the district court's order granting Mr. Petersen's motion to 
dismiss the charge of money laundering. The district court found that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence at Mr. Petersen's preliminary hearing to sustain the charge. 
The orders at issue should be affirmed for several reasons. 
First, the State's claims are not properly before this Court. The State failed to 
include a Notice of Appeal in the appellate record, and therefore, this Court cannot find 
that it has jurisdiction to consider the case. The State also failed to include any 
document or transcript in the record which reveals what arguments the prosecutor made 
to the district court. Therefore, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether the 
issues the State asserts on appeal were properly preserved for appeal, and Idaho 
appellate courts do not usually consider arguments on appeal that were not preserved 
below. 
Second, the district court properly suppressed the evidence found during the 
search of Mr. Petersen's car. It correctly determined that the "criminal indicators" 
testified to by the officers did not constitute probable cause to search Mr. Petersen's 
vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. Further, even if this Court would reverse 
on that ground, it should still affirm the district court's decision granting Mr. Petersen's 
motion to suppress because the police officers impermissibly extended the duration of 
1 
the stop and did not obtain voluntary consent from Mr. Petersen to search of the trunk of 
Mr. Petersen's car. 
Third, the district court properly found that the State had failed to present 
evidence showing probable cause of a material element of the charge of money 
laundering. Specifically, it found no evidence that Mr. Petersen knew the money in his 
car was used in a pattern of racketeering, shown by a pattern of violations of chapter 
27, title 37, Idaho Code. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Petersen was driving through northern Idaho on 1-90, heading toward Seattle, 
where he intended to visit a friend and potentially purchase a motor home. (R., p.203.) 
He had recently purchased his car in Montana and was displaying the appropriate 
temporary registration from the rear of his vehicle, as required by Montana law. 
(R., pp.206-07.) Officer Joel Gorham and Officer Jerry Moffett were working an 
"interdiction" patrol along Mr. Petersen's route, meaning they were stopping vehicles on 
the interstate, just "looking for criminals." (Tr., Vol.2, p.32, Ls.3-14.) 1 When 
Mr. Petersen drove past them, they noticed he was not displaying a front license plate, 
and so decided to pull him over. (Tr., Vol.1, p.4, Ls.9-20.) 
While the officers were still 120 yards behind Mr. Petersen, and based on what 
they admitted was a "pretty rudimentary" observation and calculation, they saw what 
1 The transcripts in this case were provided in two separate electronic PDF files. 
To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the file containing the transcript from the 
preliminary hearing, which was provided in the electronic file "Exhibits." "Vol.2" will refer 
to the transcript from the hearing of Mr. Petersen's motions to suppress and dismiss, 
which was provided in the electronic file "09-15-11 Motion, 11-19-11 Motion, 12-22-11 
Motion." Page references in both cases will refer to the ·number appearing on the 
transcript page, rather than the PDF page d1esignation. 
2 
they described as an improper signal and an unsafe merge as Mr. Petersen passed a 
semi-truck. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.14 - p.16, L.5.) The officers activated their emergency 
lights in order to pull Mr. Petersen over. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.3-8.) As they approached 
Mr. Petersen's car, they were able to see the temporary Montana registration, which 
was visible from a safe following distance.2 (Tr., Vol.2, p.35, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Petersen 
yielded appropriately, although he was close enough to the right lane of travel so as to 
concern Officer Gorham with the safety of approaching the vehicle on the driver's side. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.5-9 (Officer Gorham testifying that Mr. Petersen had stopped 
"sufficiently on the shoulder of the road"); Tr., Vol.2, p.22 - p.61, L.5 (Officer Gorham 
discussing his safety concern with the position of Mr. Peterson's vehicle vis-a-vis the 
right lane of travel).) The officers left the emergency lights on their vehicle activated 
throughout the duration of the stop. (R., p.217.) 
Officer Gorham asked Mr. Petersen for his license and registration, which 
Mr. Petersen provided. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.11-14.) The officer saw the following items 
in Mr. Petersen's car: a partially-empty twelve pack of Diet Pepsi, an air freshener, two 
cellular phones, a pair of jeans, and some miscellaneous documents. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, 
Ls.14-20; Tr., Vol.2, p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.17.) He described the car as "very clean." 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.22, L.25.) Mr. Petersen was very friendly, though his hands were shaking. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.17-18; Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.6-8.) Officer Gorham took Mr. Petersen's 
identification back to the police vehicle and gave them to· Officer Moffett, so Officer 
2 The district court ultimately found that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
stop Mr. Petersen based on the lack of a front license plate because Mr. Petersen's use 
if a temporary registration on the rear of his car comported with Montana law. 
(R., pp.206-07.) However, it did find that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the 
stop from the observations regarding the allegedly-improper signal and merge. 
(R., pp.207-09.) 
3 
Moffett could perform a records check while Officer Gorham got the citation book and 
returned to Mr. Petersen's car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.22-25.) Officer Gorham had 
decided to issue Mr. Petersen a "warning citation," which meant he had decided not to 
cite Mr. Petersen for any violation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.41, Ls.10-13.) 
While he was writing the warning, Officer Gorham had Mr. Petersen get out of his 
car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.24-25.) In speaking with Mr. Petersen, Officer Gorham learned 
that Mr. Petersen was going to Seattle to visit a friend. (Tr., Vol.1, p.26, L.24 - p.27, 
L.1.) This information was apparently suspicious to the officer. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, 
Ls.14-16.) The reason for this, according to Officer Gorham, is that Seattle is "a major 
distributor of marijuana" but cities like Boston, New York City, Minneapolis, and 
Anchorage are not3 (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.17 - p.28, L.18.) Officer Moffett walked up and 
told Officer Gorham that the records check had not revealed any reason to arrest 
Mr. Petersen, and he returned Mr. Petersen's license and registration. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, 
Ls.7-10.) Officer Gorham gave Mr. Petersen the written warning and asked 
Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go." (Tr., Vol.2, p.70, L.24 - p.71, L.2; R., p.20.) 
Mr. Petersen indicated that he was. (R., p.20; Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.15-16.) As a result, 
Mr. Petersen shook both officers' hands and turned to leave. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, 
Ls.10-12.) 
However, Officer Gorham decided that he was not done with his investigation 
and called Mr. Petersen back after a matter of a few seconds. (Tr., Vol.2, p.50, 
L.25 - p.51, L.9 (Officer Gorham admitting that he was continuing his investigation); 
3 This apparently means, according to Officer Gorham, that all vehicles headed to or 
from Seattle are suspected to be involved in marijuana trafficking simply because 
Seattle is involved in their travel plans. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, _L.17 - p.29, L.5.) 
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Tr., Vol.2, p. 77, Ls.5-11 (Officer Moffett testifying as to the time between asking 
Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go" and Officer Gorham's extension of the detention).)4 
Officer Gorham also admitted that he was not investigating any crime in particular. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4.) Additionally, he testified that he was trying to engage 
in a consensual conversation specifically to extend the detention without violating 
the rules about impermissibly extending a detention. (Tr., Vol.2, p.49, L.9 - p.50, L.2.) 
Officer Gorham first asked Mr. Petersen about his travel plans to see if he could get 
Mr. Petersen to make an inconsistent statement, and then asked if he could search the 
trunk of Mr. Petersen's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.34, Ls.3-9; Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.25.) 
Mr. Petersen opened the trunk for Officer Gorham.5 (Tr., Vol.2, p.26, Ls.1-3.) 
Inside the trunk, Officer Gorham found an average-sized duffle bag, which 
Mr. Petersen said contained $55,000 in cash.6 (Tr., Vol.2, p.26, Ls.7-25.) The money 
was separated into thousand dollar bundles, with one of the bills and a rubber band 
4 Despite being part of a special task force designed to locate evidence of major crimes, 
the officers' vehicle is not equipped with audio or video recording devices. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.44, Ls.5-8.) Therefore, the only record of what Officer Gorham said and how he said 
it is the transcript of his testimony. 
5 The district court ultimately found that Mr. Petersen had engaged in a consensual 
conversation, and therefore, the stop was not illegally extended. (See R., pp.212-17.) 
However, it did note that, if the conversation had not been consensual, the officers 
would have illegally extended the stop. (R., pp.211-12.) It also found that Mr. Petersen 
had voluntarily consented to the search of his trunk. (R., pp.210-17.) Additionally, the 
district court determined that the consent to search the trunk implicitly included consent 
to search all containers therein, absent any indication to the contrary by Mr. Petersen. 
~R., p.217.) 
When the cash was subsequently counted, it actually totaled approximately 
$71,505.00. (R., p.18.) Mr. Petersen had an additional $890.00 in cash on his person. 
(R., p.18; Tr., Vol.1, p.52, Ls.21-25.) 
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used to secure the bundles.7 (Tr., Vol.2, p.27, Ls.12-16.) Upon seeing the money and 
without requesting consent, Officer Moffett began searching the passenger 
compartment of Mr. Petersen's vehicle. 8 (See Tr., Vol.2, p.42, Ls.6-11.) While Officer 
Moffett began his search, Officer Gorham asked Mr. Petersen various questions about 
the money. (Tr., Vol.2, p.42, Ls.6-11.) Inside the passenger compartment, Officer 
Moffett found a small quantity of marijuana as well as some literature about certain 
gardening techniques (specifically, hydroponics), receipts for gardening materials, and 
documents relating to the sale and registration of the car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.96, Ls.12-19; 
R., pp.36-40.) Mr. Petersen was placed under arrest for possession of marijuana. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.70, Ls.6-8.) 
Mr. Petersen was ultimately charged with four different offenses: money 
laundering, attempted destruction of evidence, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 
and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia. (R., pp.86-88.) In regard to 
the money laundering charge, the State initially alleged several alternative means by 
which Mr. Petersen committed that offense. (See R., pp.81-82.) However, the 
magistrate court only bound Mr. Petersen over on a single theory. (Tr., Vol.1, p.104, 
Ls.5-23; see also R., pp.220-21.) Specifically, it found probable cause to believe 
Mr. Petersen had violated I.C. § 18-8201 (1) by transporting money he knew was used 
to further a pattern of racketeering, and that pattern of racketeering was evidenced by 
7 Officer Gorham testified that he encounters people carrying thousands of dollars in 
cash "all the time" and those other people did not secure their money in this particular 
fashion. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.17-20.) Rather, Officer Gorham testified that this was 
more consistent with money carried by people involved in narcotics trafficking. (See Tr., 
Vol.2, p.79, Ls.5-24.) 
8 Officer Gorham admitted that Mr. Petersen was never asked for his consent to search 
any part of the vehicle except the trunk. (Tr., Vol.2, p.52, L.20 - p.53, L.7.) 
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violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 9 (Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.5-23; see also R., 
pp.220-21.) 
Mr. Petersen filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his car as the fruit 
of an illegal search, and a motion to dismiss the information as unsupported by probable 
cause. (R., pp.98-99, 131-48.) As to the motion to suppress, Mr. Petersen alleged 
several reasons why the officers' search was illegal: they did not have reasonable 
suspicion to pull him over, they impermissibly extended the detention, the consent to 
search the trunk was not voluntarily given, the search exceeded the scope of 
the consent, and there was no probable cause to justify a warrantless search. 
(R., pp.106-29, 196-97.) In regard to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Petersen challenged 
the money laundering charge as being overbroad and unspecific in its allegations, 
noting that it did not allege a specific act (much less the two specific acts required by 
the money laundering statute) by which Mr. Petersen had violated chapter 27, title 37, 
Idaho Code, in a pattern of racketeering, and thereby committed the offense of money 
laundering. (R., p.135.) Alternatively, he argued that even if such acts were alleged, no 
such acts were alleged to have occurred in Idaho and, therefore, there was no proof on 
a material element of the offense, requiring dismissal of the charge. (R., pp.136-39.) 
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Petersen's· motions. The prosecutor 
made no arguments on the record at the hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) While 
9 Chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, is the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 
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there was a subsequent brief filed by the defendant, no brief from the State appears in 
the record inthatregard. 10 (R., pp.191-98; seegenerallyR.) 
The district court ultimately concluded that the · items in the passenger 
compartment of Mr. Petersen's car which were observed by Officer Gorham did not 
support a particularized suspicion of anything, but rather, merely gave rise to a hunch. 
(R., p.211.) Therefore, even when considered with the cash found in the trunk of the 
car, the district court found they did not amount to probable cause in the totality of the 
circumstances. (R., pp.218-19.) Additionally, it found that the scope of Mr. Petersen's 
consent did not extend to the passenger compartment. (R., p.219.) Therefore, the 
district court suppressed all the evidence found in the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle (i.e., the marijuana, the paraphernalia, and the documents) as the fruit of an 
illegal, warrantless search. (R., p.219.) 
In regard to the motion to dismiss, the district court found that Mr. Petersen had 
only been bound over on the theory that he had committed money laundering by 
transporting money he knew to be related to a pattern of racketeering evidenced by 
violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 11 (R., pp.220-21.) 
As to the theory under which Mr. Petersen had been bound over, the district 
court found that the information sufficiently alleged a factual basis for the offense so that 
Mr. Petersen was properly put on notice. (R., pp.222-23.) However, it found that no 
10 In fact, the only brief from the State which does appear in the record addresses 
Mr. Petersen's subsequent arguments on the attempted destruction of evidence 
charge. (R., pp.253-57.) The State made no arguments on appeal in that regard. (See 
ienera/ly App. Br.) 
1 The district court also found that the Information impermissibly alleged alternative 
means of committing the offense for which Mr. Petersen was not bound over. 
(R., pp.220-21.) Therefore, it struck those portions of the Information which were 
improperly alleged. (R., p.221.) 
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evidence had been proffered by the State as to one of the material elements of that 
offense - that Mr. Petersen knew or intended the money to be used to further a pattern 
of racketeering, evidenced by violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 
(R., pp.224-25.) Specifically, the district court noted that the State did not allege any 
acts occurring in Idaho which demonstrated such a pattern of violations of chapter 27, 
title 37. (See R., p.224.) The closest the State had come to meeting that burden was 
speculating that Mr. Petersen might, at some point in the future, use that money to 
purchase a controlled substance and then might possibly return to Idaho, thereby 
potentially violating chapter 27, title 37 Idaho Code. That, the district court held, was 
insufficient to meet the State's burden. (R., p.224.) Therefore, because the State had 
failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Mr. Petersen had committed 
money laundering, the district court dismissed that charge. (R., pp.224-25.) 
The State claims to have appealed from those decisions. (App. Br., p.3.) 
However, no notice of appeal appears in the record. (See generally R.) In its brief, the 
State challenges the district court's determination that there was no probable cause to 
justify the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's car 
pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 12 (App. Br., pp.5-9.) 
It also challenges the district court's finding that there was no probable cause showing 
made in regard to all the material elements of the money laundering charge, and so 
challenged the district court's dismissal of that charge. (App. Br., pp.9-13.) 
12 In making this argument, the State presumes that the search of the trunk was valid 
and the money found therein could be considered in the probable cause determination. 




The State has framed the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the district court err in granting [Mr.] Petersen's suppression motion based on 
its conclusion that there was insufficient probable cause to believe incriminating 
evidence would be found in the passenger compartment of [Mr.] Petersen's car 
after evaluating the totality of the circumstances including the large amount of 
bundled cash found in the trunk considered in light of [Mr.] Petersen's 
demeanor? 
2. Did the district court err when it concluded that the testimony presented during 
the preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause to believe [Mr.] Petersen 
committed the crime of money laundering? 
Because there is a threshold procedural issue, and because the State's framing 
of the suppression issue is unduly narrow, Mr. Petersen characterizes the issues on 
appeal as follows: 
1. Whether the State has failed to provide an adequate record for review by failing 
to include any notice of appeal to demonstrate this Court's jurisdiction, and by 
failing to include evidence demonstrating the issues it now raises on appeal were 
preserved below. 
2. Whether the district court's order suppressing the evidence should be affirmed 
because the officers engaged in an illegal search of Mr. Petersen's car. 
3. Whether the district court erred when it concluded that the testimony presented 
during the preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause to believe 




The State Has Failed To Provide An Adequate Record For Review By Failing To 
Include Any Notice Of Appeal To Demonstrate This Court's Jurisdiction, And By Failing 
To Include Evidence Demonstrating The Issues It Now Raises On Appeal Were 
Preserved Below 
A. Introduction 
The notice of appeal confers jurisdiction to the appellate court to consider the 
arguments on appeal. Where it is not included in the appellate record, the appellate 
court cannot conclude that it has such jurisdiction. Because the State failed to include 
the notice of appeal in the record, it has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that 
this Court has jurisdiction to hear the case, and so this Court should dismiss the State's 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Additionally, Idaho's appellate courts usually do not consider arguments that 
were not preserved below. The State has failed to meet its burden to provide an 
adequate record demonstrating the arguments it pursues on appeal were sufficiently 
preserved below. Furthermore, silences in the record are presumed to support the 
district court's decisions. Therefore, this Court is without the authority to consider the 
State's arguments on appeal, and even if it does, the silence as to the State's 
arguments below should be deemed to support the district court's decision to grant 
Mr. Petersen's motions. 
11 
Because There Is No Notice Of Appeal In The Record, This Court Lacks The 
Jurisdiction To Hear This Case 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, when the appellate record does not 
include the notice of appeal, the appellate court does not have jurisdiction to hear the 
case. Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe I, 147 Idaho 314, 316 (2009). The State has 
failed to demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this case, as it has failed to 
include the notice of appeal in the appellate record. (See generally R.) There do not 
appear to have been any motions to augment the record filed by the State. ( See 
generally, R.) Nor does it appear that the State challenged the record for sufficiency 
during the objection to the record phase of the appeal, as permitted by I.AR. 29 and 
I.A.R. 30. (See generally R.) As such, because the notice of appeal is not present in 
the appellate record in this case, this Court cannot find that it has jurisdiction to hear the 
case, and so should dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Doe I, 147 Idaho at 
316. 
C. The State Has Failed To Prove That Its Arguments On Appeal Were Properly 
Preserved Below, And So Those Arguments Should Not Be Considered By This 
Court 
The State, as the appellant in this case, bears the burden of providing an 
adequate record for review. State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 785 (1999); State 
v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). "Where pertinent portions of the record are 
missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the district court." 
Coma, 133 Idaho at 34. In the absence of an adequate appellate record, the appellate 
court will not presume error below. Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land 
Investment, LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 751 (2009). 
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Additionally, "[i]t is well established that issues not raised in the trial court cannot 
later be raised on appeal unless the alleged error would constitute 'fundamental error.'" 
State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844 (1992) (citations omitted); see, e.g., State v. 
Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 420-21 (2012); Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521-22 
(201 0); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602 (2009); State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 
446 (2008). As the State has failed to ensure that the record demonstrates what 
arguments it raised below, it has not met its burden. This Court should not presume 
error, but rather, should presume the silence in the record as to the State's arguments 
support the district court's decisions (i.e., that the State's arguments were insufficient to 
establish that the search of Mr. Petersen's vehicle was justified by an exception to the 
warrant requirement and that the State's arguments were insufficient to demonstrate 
probable cause of all the material elements of the money laundering charge). 
The only arguments made by the prosecutor which are preserved in the record 
are its assertions to the magistrate court made at the preliminary hearing (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.90, L.9 - p.96, L.1), and its arguments in regard to the destruction of evidence charge. 
(R., pp.253-57.) As the arguments made before the magistrate predate both of 
Mr. Petersen's motions before the district court, they cannot be said to preserve any 
response thereto, particularly since they were not even made to the same court. 
(See R., pp.74-80 (minutes from the preliminary hearing, dated May 10, 2011); R., p.98 
(motion to suppress, dated May 27, 2011); R., p.131 (motion to dismiss, dated 
September 9, 2011).) In fact, defense counsel specifically reserved the issue of the 
motion to suppress for the district court. (Tr., Vol.1, p.96, Ls.9-12.) Neither the Clerk's 
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Record, nor the Reporter's Transcript, reveals the prosecutor's arguments in regard to 
Mr. Petersen's motion to suppress or his motion to dismiss. 13 (See genera//y, Tr.; R.) 
As a result of that omission, the appellate record does not inform this Court what 
arguments were made and preserved below by the State. Therefore, this Court cannot 
determine whether the issues now made by the State on appeal were, in fact, preserved 
below. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578 (1991 ). As such, those 
arguments which this Court cannot find to have been preserved below should not be 
considered on appeal. See id. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's 
order on this basis without needing to consider the merits of the State's claim. 
11. 
The District Court's Order Suppressing The Evidence Should Be Affirmed Because The 
Officers Engaged In An Illegal Search Of Mr. Petersen's Car 
A. Introduction 
The district court properly found that the officers lacked probable cause to 
conduct a search of Mr. Petersen's car pursuant to the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement. The information they highlighted did no more than give the 
officers, by their own admission, an unparticularized hunch. Warrantless invasions of 
privacy are not permitted when officers merely have hunches of criminal activity. 
Alternatively, this Court should affirm the district court's decision because the 
officers impermissibly extended the detention, as no reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave when, after turning to leave, he is told by a police officer to wait and 
13 For example, the record does not indicate which exceptions to the warrant 
requirement the prosecutor believed had been proved by the evidence. 
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answer more questions, particularly when he is on the side of an interstate highway, 
close enough to the lane of travel to raise safety concerns, and the emergency lights on 
the officer's vehicle are still activated. 
Alternatively, the evidence in the car should have been suppressed because the 
officers did not obtain voluntary consent to search any part of Mr. Petersen's car. 
Rather, they coerced him into giving his consent to search the trunk. Furthermore, the 
district court properly found that, in any case, that consent did not extend to the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle. For any of those reasons, this Court should 
affirm the district court's order suppressing the evidence found during the illegal search 
of the car, 14 
8. The District Court Properly Suppressed The Evidence Found In Mr. Petersen's 
Car When It Determined That The Officers' Search Of That Car Was Not 
Justified By The Automobile Exception Because The Officers Did Not Have 
Probable Cause To Suspect Any Criminal Activity 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. '. ." U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961 ); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAH0 CONST. Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
14 If this Court finds that the decision to suppress the fruit of the illegal search on one of 
the alternative grounds, then the search of the trunk would be part of the illegal search. 
Therefore, in that situation, this Court should include an order that evidence found in the 
trunk should also be suppressed. · 
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A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment. The State can only 
overcome that presumption by demonstrating that one of the exceptional, well-
established, and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable to 
the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding 
the same standard applies to Art. I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile 
exception, which allows police officers to search a vehicle when they have "probable 
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime." 
State v. Anderson, _ Idaho __ , 2012 Opinion No.123, pp.4-5 (2012); see also 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
149 (1925). The State argues that the district court's finding that this exception did not 
justify the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's vehicle 
was in error because it believes the officers had probable cause from the "criminal 
indicators" identified by the officers, when considered alongside the cash found in the 
trunk. (App. Br., pp.5-9.) The State is mistaken because those factors do not constitute 
probable cause; at best, they give rise to a hunch. 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court, probable cause is established "when the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give 
rise-in the mind of a reasonable person-to a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place." Id. Probable cause does not 
arise when the officer possesses only a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion of 
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criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 
59 (Ct App. 2011 ). In order to be a "particularized" suspicion, the officer's suspicion 
must satisfy two elements: ( 1) it must be based on the totality of the circumstances, 
and (2) it must yield a reasonable suspicion that the particular person is engaged in a 
criminal activity. State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). Specificity in this 
regard is a core requirement of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 
n.18; United States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411,418 (1981). As such, where there is a lack 
of evidence to show any specific criminal activity (i.e., where "the evidence available to 
the officers prior to the unlawful search did not implicate any specific criminal activity'), 
the officers do not have a particularized suspicion. State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 
600 (Ct. App. 2010) (interpreting State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 (Ct. App. 2006)) 
(emphasis added). 
In Bunting, the only evidence that could properly be considered in assessing 
whether there was probable cause for a search was not sufficiently particularized to 
justify the search. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 386. That was because the information 
considered was all of a non-criminal nature and, even though that information "could be 
viewed in a suspicious light," it did not reasonably demonstrate the probability of any 
particular crime would be found during a subsequent search. See id.; Newman, 149 
Idaho at 600. Therefore, where facts articulated by officers do not reasonably suggest 
any particular criminal activity is afoot, especially where all the facts articulated are not 
criminal in nature, they do not form a particularized suspicion of criminal activity upon 
which to justify a probable cause search. See id. 
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The facts known to the officers in regard to Mr. Petersen do not reasonably 
suggest that any particular criminal activity was afoot. In fact, Officer Gorham admitted 
that he did not have a suspicion that any particular criminal activity was afoot: 
Q. What were you investigating [when you called Mr.· Petersen back after 
telling him he was free to leave]? 
A. Potential crime. 
Q. What crime? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What crime did you reasonably suppose he was engaged in? 
A. I'm not sure. That's why I asked for consent to search the vehicle to 
find possible evidence of that crime. And criminal indicators could be any 
crime throughout the spectrum. People are going to show indicators, 
whether they are murderers, whether they had child porn inside the 
vehicle, drugs, money. Who knows? ... 
Q. So you had a suspicion he had committed or [was] about to commit a 
crime, but you don't know what crime? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, it could have been anything, reckless driving to terrorism? 
A. Could be. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4 (emphasis added).) With those answers, Officer 
Gorham basically admitted that he only had a hunch of criminal activity, and that his 
hunch was not particularized in any way, which means the officers could not have had 
the necessary probable cause to search the vehicle. Compare Bunting, 142 Idaho at 
915; Newman, 149 Idaho at 600; see also State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2008) 
(discussing officers' hunches and the impropriety of basing searches thereon). Given 
the non-criminal nature of the items observed in Mr. Petersen's car, and the low degree 
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of suspicion that those items generated as a whole, even in the officer's own mind, 15 
a reasonable person would not see probable cause in the totality of these 
circumstances, upon which the officers could legally conduct a search pursuant to the 
automobile exception. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915. 
Apart from those factors, which could not reasonably generate an articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity, there was only one other fact known to Officer Moffett 
when he began his search: there was money in the trunk. 16 That too, was a fact of a 
non-criminal nature, and was not particularly suspicious. (See R., pp.218-19.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Petersen gave the officers a legitimate explanation for carrying that 
amount of cash: he was planning on purchasing a motor home, and, given his history 
as a car salesman, he preferred to make such deals in cash. (R., p.219.) Therefore, 
the district court found the fact that Mr. Petersen had a legitimate explanation for having 
the money in his car gave that money a low degree of suspicion as well, and it 
15 Mr. Petersen recognizes that the test for probable cause is not based on the 
subjective intent of the officer. See State v. Schwarlz, 133 Idaho 463, 467 (1999). 
However, Officer Gorham testified that he believes himself to be a credible witness, and 
that the courts would agree with him. (Tr., Vol.2, p.44, Ls.8-10.) Therefore, if he really 
is as credible as he believes himself to be, the fact that he did not have a particularized 
suspicion of any specific criminal activity is an indicator that a reasonable person in the 
same situation would also not have a particularized suspicion. 
16 Officer Moffett began searching the trunk of Mr. Petersen's car without asking 
for Mr. Petersen's consent when he saw the money in the trunk. (Tr., Vol.2, p.95, 
Ls.2-8.) Therefore, even though Mr. Petersen did make comments to Officer Gorham at 
that same time, those comments cannot factor into the determination of whether there 
was probable cause. Only those facts known to Officer Moffett at the time he began his 
search can factor into the probable cause determination. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 805; 
Anderson, _ Idaho _, 2012 Opinion No.123, pp.4-5. Because those additional 
comments occurred after Officer Moffett had begun the search of the passenger 
compartment, they cannot factor into the probable cause determination. According to 
Officer Moffett, the information of which he was aware when he started the warrantless 
search of the passenger compartment consisted only of the cash itself and the "criminal 
indicators" identified by Officer Gorham. (Tr., Vol.2, p.95, L.9 - p.96, L.7.) 
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determined that, even considering it alongside the other factors, they were not of a 
significant weight, and therefore, did not give rise to probable cause. (R., pp.218-219.) 
Therefore, given the non-criminal nature and low degree of suspicion attached to all the 
factors identified by the officers, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to 
suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment as the fruit of an illegal 
search. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915. 
C. The District Court's Order Suppressing The Evidence Should Also Be Affirmed 
Because The Officers lmpermissibly Extended The Duration Of The Stop 
Even if this Court would tend to agree with the State that the "criminal indicators" 
combined with the money could generate probable cause, it should still affirm the district 
court's suppression order on other grounds. "'Where an order of the lower court is 
correct, but based on an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct 
theory."' Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 415 (2008) (quoting Andre v. Morrow, 106 
Idaho 455, 459 (1984)); see, e.g., State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 227 (1993) (applying 
this rule while affirming the lower court's order to suppress evidence found during an 
illegal search)). This Court should affirm the order suppressing the evidence found 
during an illegal search because the officers unreasonably prolonged their detention of 
Mr. Petersen. See, e.g., Curl, 125 Idaho at 227. 
In this scenario, the officers' search of the trunk of Mr. Petersen's car constituted 
a warrantless search without a justifying exception present. As a result, the cash could 
not be considered in the totality of circumstances to determine whether probable cause 
existed for the search of the passenger compartment. That would leave only the 
"criminal indicators" to be weighed in that regard, and they only generate a hunch at 
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most. Therefore, the district court's order to suppress the evidence found in the 
passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's car should be affirmed on this alternative 
ground. Athay, 146 Idaho at 415; Curl, 125 Idaho at 227. 
When officers effectuate a traffic stop, the detention of the driver must be based 
on reasonable suspicion and "must also be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 
59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The duration of a traffic stop cannot be extended once the purpose 
of the stop is completed. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002). It is 
clear that, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after 
the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, no matter how short, extends 
the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy and liberty of 
the vehicle's occupants." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). There are 
two exceptions to this rule. First, if the officer observes objective, specific, and 
particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the purpose 
of the stop may evolve, allowing the otherwise impermissible extended detention and 
investigation. See, e.g., State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (Ct. App. 2001). 
A mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion on the part of the officer is insufficient to 
trigger this exception. See Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64. Otherwise, the encounter must 
evolve into a consensual encounter, but such evolution only occurs when an officer 
returns the driver's identification and there is no "further show of authority which would 
convey a message that the individual is not free to leave." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. 
If the encounter does not become consensual and the officer ·prolongs the detention, the 
officer violates the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.; Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8. 
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In this case, as described in Section ll(B), supra, the officers had not observed 
objective, specific, and particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of any 
specific criminal activity. (See, e.g., R., p.211.) Rather, all they had at the point Officer 
Gorham gave Mr. Petersen the warning citation, and thereby completed the purpose of 
the stop, was a hunch - they did not suspect any particular criminal activity based on 
their observations. (R., p.211.) Therefore, because there were no objective 
particularized facts to justify a shift in the investigation, the officer's questions about an 
issue unrelated to the purpose of the stop after the purpose of the stop was completed 
by issuing the warning citation, the presumably-impermissible extension of the stop is 
not justified by this justification. See Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 916; Swindle, 148 Idaho at 
64. Furthermore, Officer Gorham admitted that he was continuing his investigation 
when he asked Mr. Petersen the additional questions after giving him the warning 
citation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.51, Ls.5-9.) Therefore, as the district court properly held 
{R., p.211), Officer Gorham improperly extended the duration of the stop. See, e.g., 
Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8; Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. As such, the only way that 
Officer Gorham's investigation did not violate Mr. Petersen's constitutional right to be 
free from warrantless seizures is if the encounter became consensual. 
The encounter between Mr. Petersen and the officers did not become 
consensual because Officer Gorham made a further show of authority when, as 
Mr. Petersen attempted to leave, Officer Gorham called him back to answer more 
questions. That conveyed the message that Mr. Petersen was not, in fact, free to leave 
after all. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. The ultimate conclusion of whether Mr. Petersen 
was free to leave is not based on what the officer subjectively intended to do 
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(i.e., engage in a consensual conversation), but rather, is based on how an objectively 
reasonable person would feel, based on that reasonable person's interpretation of the 
officer's statements and actions. See, e.g., id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991 )) 
(holding that a seizure occurs when the reasonable person would not feel free "'to 
disregard the police and go about his business"')). As with the officer's subjective 
beliefs, the defendant's subjective beliefs about whether he was free to go are not 
relevant; the courts must determine if a reasonable person would feel free to leave. 
State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
However, it is noteworthy that Officer Gorham admitted the only reason he asked 
Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go" was to attempt to get around the legal requirement 
that he not extend traffic stops without particularized suspicion. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, 
p.10, Ls.15-16; Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) He never actually told Mr. Petersen that he could 
leave. 17 (See generally R., Trs.) Officer Gorham stated that, as Mr. Petersen started to 
head back to his vehicle, "I started up a consensual conversation with him, a couple 
more questions/ wanted to ask him and if he wanted to stick around and answer them, 
I would like to talk to him." (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.14-17 (emphasis added).) He claimed 
that the reason he reinitiated the interrogation was "[m)y reasonable suspicion was 
starting to pique. So as an officer, it was my duty to ... confront him or deny my 
17 Officer Gorham testified at the preliminary hearing: "I asked [Mr. Petersen] if he was 
good to go, in which [sic] he told me he was." (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.15-16.) That was 
consistent with his police report. (R., p.20.) However, at the hearing on Mr. Petersen's 
motions, he testified: "I told him he was good to go." (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) The 
district court resolved this contradiction, finding, as a matter of fact, that Officer Gorham 
"asked Defendant if he was 'good to go."' (R., p.202 (emphasis added).) Idaho's 
appellate courts defer to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232 (2005). 
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suspicion. I asked him a couple of additional question s is [sic] one of those ways to do 
that" (Tr., Vol.2, p.46, Ls.4-9.) However, Officer Gorham admitted that "nothing 
increased my suspicion," as nothing about the encounter had changed. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.47, L.20 - p.49, L.11.) Therefore, a reasonable person, who may have assumed he 
was free to leave, but was disabused of that belief by the officer's decision to call him 
back to ask him additional questions within seconds of his attempt to leave (see Tr., 
Vol.2, p.77, Ls.1-11), would interpret that as a show of authority that would convey the 
message to a reasonable person that Mr. Petersen was not, in fact, free to leave. See 
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person would not have felt free to get in his car and drive away from Officer Gorham, 
and so, despite his attempt to circumvent Mr. Petersen's constitutional rights, he illegally 
prolonged the detention of Mr. Petersen. 
Additionally, when a person is ordered out of their vehicle pursuant to 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 160, 111 n.6 (1977), it is likely that they "would not 
believe that the traffic stop was over until he or she was permitted to return [to their 
car]." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651. In this case, Officer Gorham only asked if 
Mr. Petersen was good to go; he never actually told Mr. Petersen that he was free to 
leave. And while Mr. Petersen may have initially interpreted that question as permission 
to return to his car (evidenced by his turning to head .toward the car), he was 
immediately disabused of that belief when Officer Gorham spoke up after just a few 
seconds (Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.5-11), indicating that Mr. Petersen should wait because he 
had more questions to ask. In such situations, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
determined that "[t]he average person may not have felt comfortable driving away at 
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that point, knowing that the officer wanted to say something." State v. Ray, 153 Idaho 
564, 568 (2012). Therefore, a reasonable person in Mr. Petersen's situation would not 
have felt free to leave, and thus, the conversation was not consensual. See Gutierrez, 
137 Idaho at 650. 
Furthermore, this encounter was taking place on the side of an interstate 
highway and the parked cars were close enough to the lanes of travel to give both 
officers some concern as to their safety from other vehicles on the road. (See, e.g., Tr., 
Vol.2, p.60, L.19 - p.61, L.5 (Officer Gorham describing his concern).) In fact, according 
to Officer Moffett, "it's a very tight roadway through there and it would be [a] safety issue 
for us to turn ou[r] lights off."18 (Tr., Vol.1, p.65, Ls.16-19.) As such, that particular 
shoulder of the highway was not a safe place where reasonable people would stand 
around and converse. A reasonable person would not remain in such a situation any 
longer than need be. Therefore, when Officer Gorham told Mr. Petersen that he had 
more questions, a reasonable person would not believe Mr. Petersen remained in that 
vulnerable location on the side of the interstate highway of his own volition; a 
reasonable person would believe that Officer Gorham was· detaining Mr. Petersen in 
that situation. 
That determination - that a reasonable person, who is notified by a police officer, 
while they are standing in a vulnerable location on the side of an interstate highway, that 
18 Again, Officer Gorham offered some contradictory testimony in regard to whether the 
lights remained on during the encounter, although he ultimately admitted he could not 
actually remember whether the lights were on or off during the encounter. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.50, Ls.3-24.) The district court resolved that factual issue, finding, as a matter of fact, 
that the emergency lights remained on throughout the encounter. (R., p.217.) As that 
finding was based on substantial evidence in the record, this Court should defer to it. 
See Watts, 142 Idaho at 232. · 
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the officer has more questions to ask, would not feel free to leave - is even more 
reasonable where the police vehicle's emergency lights remain activated. See, e.g., 
State v. Mireless, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1992). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that, in such situations, "[f]ew, if any reasonable citizens, while parked, would 
simply drive away and assume that the police, in turning on the emergency 
flashers, would be communicating something other than for them to remain." 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 487 (2009) (quoting Lawson v. State, 707 A.2d 947, 
951 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)). As such, the fact that the officers left their vehicle's 
emergency lights activated throughout their encounter with Mr. Petersen (R., p.217), 
further evidences that a reasonable person in Mr. Petersen's situation would not have 
felt free to disregard Officer Gorham and drive off, meaning the subsequent 
interrogation was not consensual. See id.; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Hodari D., 499 
U.S. at 628; Ray, 153 Idaho at 568; Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 487. 
Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances in this case an ordinary person 
would not feel free to simply disregard the officer and leave, regardless of how the 
officer intended the situation to play out. Ray, 153 Idaho at 568; Willoughby, 147 Idaho 
at 487; Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651; Mire/ess, 133 Idaho at 692. As such, the 
conversation between the officers and Mr. Petersen after they returned his identification 
and completed the purpose of the traffic stop was not consensual, and as a result, 
Officer Gorham illegally extended the detention. Compare Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650-
53. 
As a result, the only evidence that could properly be considered in assessing 
whether there was probable cause to search the passenger compartment of 
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Mr. Petersen's car were those facts known to the officers before they illegally 
extended the duration of the stop (i.e., the supposed "criminal indicators"). Since those 
facts would only give rise to a hunch (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4), they 
did not give rise to the necessary probable cause to justify the search of the passenger 
compartment under the automobile exception. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 805; Anderson, 
_ Idaho_, 2012 Opinion No.123, pp.4-5. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
district court's order suppressing the evidence on this alternative theory. See Athay, 
146 Idaho at 415; Curl, 125 Idaho at 227. 
111. 
The District Court's Decision To Dismiss The Charge Of Money Laundering Should Be 
Affirmed Because The State Failed To Demonstrate Probable Cause That Mr. Petersen 
Committed Such An Offense 
A. Introduction 
Unless the State offers evidence showing probable cause as to a violation of all 
the material elements of an offense, the district court is required to dismiss the charge. 
Here, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Petersen knew or intended the 
money in his car to be used to further a pattern of racketeering evidenced by multiple, 
related violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. In fact, the State presented no 
e.vidence that Mr. Petersen had done, or intended to do anything, within the State of 
Idaho that violated that chapter of the Idaho Code. Nevertheless, the State contends 
that it should be allowed to prosecute Mr. Petersen on that charge. Because there was 
no evidence in regard to one of the material elements of the charge, the district court 
properly dismissed the charge. This Court should affirm that decision. 
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B. The State Offered No Evidence To Support A Finding Of Probable Cause That 
Mr. Petersen Knew Or Intended The Money In His Car To Contribute To A 
Pattern Of Racketeering Evidenced By Multiple, Related Violations Of Chapter 
27, Title 37, Idaho Code 
After a case is bound over to the district court, the district court may review the 
finding of probable cause at the defendant's request, made via a motion to dismiss the 
charge. I.C. § 19-815A; State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 372 (Ct. App. 2003). When the 
district court, in considering such a motion, determines that probable cause did not, in 
fact, exist, it is required to dismiss the allegation. Id. Such a motion was made in this 
case, and the district court, upon finding no probable cause existed, dismissed the 
charge of money laundering. (R., pp.131-48, 224-25.) The State appeals from that 
decision, contending that it demonstrated the necessary probable cause to support the 
charge. (App. Br., pp.9-13.) 
On appeal, "[w]hen reviewing a finding of probable cause [or lack thereof, the 
appellate courts] defer to the lower court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence and review de novo whether those facts as found constitute 
probable cause." State v. Marlinez-Gonzafez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (Ct. App. 2012). In 
this case, the facts found by the district court do not constitute probable cause that Mr. 
Petersen committed money laundering in the State of Idaho, and therefore, the district 
court's order dismissing that charge should be affirmed. 
As a preliminary matter, the magistrate limited the scope of its order binding 
Mr. Petersen over to the district court, and the allegation of money laundering in Count I 
was only viable insofar as it comported with the magistrate's order. (R., pp.220-21.) 
Specifically, the magistrate limited its finding of probable cause to the allegation that 
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Mr. Petersen violated I.C. § 18-8201 (1 ), and further limited its finding of probable cause 
as the charge relates to alleged violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code as 
evidence of the pattern of racketeering. 19 (R., pp.220-21; Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.10-23.) 
Therefore, Count I only properly alleges that "on or about March 14, 2011, Mr. Petersen, 
while in Kootenai County, Idaho, knowingly and intentionally concealed and/or 
transported $71,505.00, that he knew was used to commit or further a pattern of 
racketeering activity," and such pattern of racketeering activity constituted a violation of 
the provisions of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, thereby violating I.C. § 18-8201(1).20 
(See R., p.222.) 
In considering the properly-limited charge, the district court found that there were 
no facts on the record which attested to whether or not Mr. Petersen knew the money 
was used to commit or further a pattern of racketeering activity in the form of violations 
of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, nor were there any permissible inferences to be 
drawn from the facts in that regard. (R., p.224.) The evidence presented by the State 
(after the properly-suppressed evidence is factored out) only demonstrated that 
Mr. Petersen was traveling through Idaho, headed toward Seattle in a newly-purchased, 
relatively-clean car, which had in it some diet soda, a pair of jeans, two cell phones, and 
19 I.C. § 18-8201 (1) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally give, sell, 
transfer, trade, invest, conceal, transport, or make available anything of 
value that the person knows is intended to be used to commit or further a 
pattern of racketeering activity as defined in section 18-7803(d), Idaho 
Code, or a violation of the provisions of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 
20 The district court also found that the information improperly alleged a violation of 
I.C. § 18-8201 by means on which the magistrate court did not find probable cause. 
(R., pp.220-21.) As a result, it limited its consideration to only those aspects of the 
information which comported with the magistrate's order and dismissed the remainder 
of the charge. (R., p.221.) 
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a large amount of cash. (R., pp.218-19.) The only evidence in the record indicates that 
the cash was to be used to purchase a motor home in Washington per Mr. Petersen's 
preferences regarding such transactions. (R., pp.218-19.)- That evidence does not 
prove multiple violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, evidencing a pattern of 
racketeering, and in fact, fails to suggest any criminal activity at all. (See R., p.219.) 
Where no facts speak to a material element of the offense, there is no probable cause 
that the crime has occurred. I.C.R. 5.1 (b); see State v. McLellan, _ Idaho_, 2013 
Opinion No.5, pp.3-4 (Ct. App. 2013) (affirming the district court's order dismissing an 
allegation when the State failed to present evidence to support a finding of probable 
cause on all the material elements of the charged offense). 
Specifically, the material element of the offense at issue is whether Mr. Petersen 
knew the money was going to be used to commit or further a pattern of racketeering, 
meaning (based on the magistrate's finding of probable cause) that there would need to 
be proof that he knew the money was going to be used to commit multiple violations of 
chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, so as to evidence a pattern of racketeering. The State 
mistakenly believes that it only needs to prove that Mr. Petersen knew the money was 
related to some nebulous drug trafficking enterprise. 21 (App. Br., p.13.) 
21 In support of its argument for probable cause, it relies on the same factors upon 
which it relied to show probable cause for the warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment. As discussed in Section 11(8), supra, they do not demonstrate probable 
cause of any particular criminal activity, which includes the charge of money laundering. 
Therefore, the presence of those factors does not demonstrate probable cause to 
support the charge. And even if they did constitute probaple cause of a violation of 
chapter 27, title 37 (intent to purchase materials that might potentially be used in a 
clandestine operation), the State would still have to prove at least one other violation 
with the money in order to show a pattern of racketeering. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-7803(d). 
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That is incorrect; a charge of money laundering requires a more specific 
showing. See I.C. § 18-8201 (1 ). To prove a charge of money laundering, the State 
must prove that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering, which, based on 
the magistrate's findings in this case, can only be shown via a pattern of violations of 
chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. (R., pp.220-22; Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.10-23.) To show 
a pattern of racketeering, the State must prove "at least two incidents of racketeering 
that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and so are 
not isolated incidents." I.C. § 18-7803(d); see also State v. Gertsch, 137 Idaho 387, 394 
(2002) (applying the definition of a pattern of racketeering in I.C. § 18-7803(d) to 
charges of money laundering under I.C. § 18-8201). The State has failed to present 
evidence demonstrating such incidents, thereby failing to establish probable cause of a 
material element of the offense. As such, the district court properly dismissed Count I. 
First, the State did not actually allege any violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho 
Code in regard to Count I. (See R., p.86.) The only such allegations in the information 
are contained in Counts Ill and IV. (See R, pp.86-88.) However, the only evidence 
supporting those allegations was suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search, and so 
they cannot provide evidence of a pattern of violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho 
Code. Therefore, they do not show probable cause of a pattern of racketeering. 
(See R., p.219.) 
Even if they were viable allegations, they do not allege a pattern of violations of 
chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code; rather, they allege a single temporal event of violation 
which falls under multiple statutes. (See R., pp.87-88.) Because they only address a 
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single temporal event, they do not demonstrate a pattern, and thus, they would still be 
insufficient to support the money laundering charge, which requires proof of a pattern of 
racketeering. I.C. § 18-8201(1); Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935-36 (2007) (noting 
that to constitute a pattern of racketeering, a single scheme must be continuing and 
ongoing, not a single temporal event). Rather, at most, they only allege one event, and 
not the two necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering. Compare Spence v. 
Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 774-75 (1994) (upholding the district court's dismissal of a 
racketeering claim when the complaining party failed to allege two incidents of 
racketeering to demonstrate the pattern). Therefore, the State failed to allege a 
violation of I.C. § 18-8201 as the magistrate had bound the count over, much less 
present probable cause that such a violation occurred. As such, the district court's 
order dismissing that charge should be affirmed. 
Second, the only evidence presented which potentially tends to show a pattern of 
racketeering only tends to show that the criminal enterprise and conduct underlying the 
pattern of racketeering occurred in Minnesota and was going to occur in Washington, 
not in ldaho.22 (See generally R., Trs.) Idaho laws do nof apply to acts which occur 
beyond the borders of the State. See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 913-14 
(1992) (holding that the criminal conduct at issue, in whole or in part, must actually 
22 That evidence, which consisted of documents regarding the purchase of gardening 
supplies and literature about gardening techniques, were properly suppressed as 
illegally seized from the passenger compartment of the vehicle. (See R., p.219.) 
Therefore, even if they were otherwise sufficient to establish a pattern of criminal activity 
in Idaho, they still would not demonstrate probable cause of a violation of I.C. § 18-8201 
because that evidence is inadmissible as fruit of an illegal search. Even if this evidence 
was not properly suppressed, it still does not provide any evidence that there was a 
clandestine racketeering operation or that Mr. Petersen knew about that operation. 
Therefore, even if this evidence were to be considered, the district court still properly 
dismissed the money laundering charge. · 
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occur in Idaho, or else Idaho's courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
conduct). In order to prove the material elements of I.C. § 18-8201 (1 ), as bound over 
by the magistrate, the State would have to have presented evidence showing two 
related violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, showing a pattern of racketeering. 
(See R., pp.220-22; Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.10-23.) Because Idaho's laws cannot 
criminalize acts in other states, any acts that occurred in Minnesota or Washington 
cannot constitute violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. No purchases or 
investments furthering any alleged clandestine operation occurred in Idaho, nor were 
any expected to occur in Idaho. (See generally Trs., R.) Therefore, the State has 
presented no evidence suggesting that a violation of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, 
occurred or was imminent. As such, even considering the evidence which might 
suggest other acts which might establish a pattern of racketeering, the State has failed 
to present any evidence showing a probable cause that there was a pattern of violations 
of Idaho law such that the charge under I.C. § 18-8201(1) is sustainable. Therefore, the 
district court's order dismissing that charge should be affirmed. 
Third, even if the State had presented sufficient evidence to show a pattern of 
racketeering, it still failed to present any evidence that the money found in the trunk of 
the vehicle was related in any way to that pattern of racketeering, much less that 
Mr. Petersen knew of any such connection. (See generally R., Trs.) As such, the State 
has still failed to prove a material element of the offenses. I.C. § 18-8201 (1 ). To that 
point, the district court only found the mere speculation that Mr. Petersen might go on to 
Seattle, where he might purchase marijuana, that he might do so with the money in his 
trunk, and that he might then return through Idaho, and in that way, might violate 
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chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, and thereby might violate I.C. § 18-8201 (1 ). 23 
(R., p.224.) 
It is well-established that mere speculation is insufficient to support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion, much less the higher standard of probable cause. See, e.g., 
State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 
738 (Ct. App. 2005). "There must be 'some objective manifestation that the person 
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity."' Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 
435,436 (1998) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)) (emphasis 
added). Speculation that Mr. Petersen might, at some unknown point in the future, be 
engaged in some, non-specific criminal activity, that might potentially (but not 
necessarily) violate Idaho law, does not meet that standard. Absent any connection 
between the money and the pattern of racketeering, the State failed to demonstrate the 
necessary probable cause to proceed with the charge of money laundering. Therefore, 
the district court's order dismissing that charge should be affirmed. 
Furthermore, the State must also prove that Mr. Petersen was aware of the 
connection between the money and the alleged criminal enterprise in order to launder 
the money for that enterprise. I.C. § 18-8201(1); see Mannas, 143 Idaho at 936. 
Where no evidence is presented that the defendants in a money laundering case 
associated or agreed to engage in any of the predicate acts, nor is there evidence that 
they shared a common purpose to engage in a predicate act, the State fails to prove a 
violation of the money laundering statute. Id. As such, the· defendant's knowledge of 
the racketeering enterprise and the relationship of the money thereto is also a material 
23 The State would still have to show evidence of a pattern of racketeering, not a one-
time event. See Mannas, 143 Idaho at 935-36; Spence, 126 Idaho at 774-75. 
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element of the offense that the State must prove. See id. As the district court correctly 
pointed out, no evidence or inferences from the evidence presented even suggest 
Mr. Petersen was aware of any connection between the money and an alleged 
clandestine enterprise.24 (R., p.224; see generally R., Tr.) Therefore, the State failed to 
meet its burden of proof on this element and the district court properly dismissed that 
charge. I.C.R. 5.1(b); see McLellan, _Idaho_, 2013 Opinion No.5, pp.3-4. 
The charge of money laundering is far more specific than the State contends, 
and it has failed to present evidence on several of the material elements of that charge 
in this case. It failed to provide any evidence demonstrating a pattern of racketeering, 
made up of multiple violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, it failed to present any 
evidence that the money in Mr. Petersen's car was related to that pattern of 
racketeering, and it failed to present any evidence that Mr. Petersen knew of such a 
connection. Rather, all it presented was the mere speculation that the money might be 
used to buy a controlled substance, which at some point might turn into a violation of 
Idaho law, in connection to some speculated, nebulous drug trafficking operation. 
Given that speculation, the evidence presented by the State does not add up to 
probable cause of a violation of I.C. § 18-8201 (1 ), and therefore, the district court 
properly dismissed that charge. This Court should affirm that order. 
24 In fact, no evidence of any such enterprise exists in the record, much less of a 




Mr. Petersen respectfully requests this Court dismiss the State's appeal for its 
failure to provide an adequate record to show that this Court has either the jurisdiction 
or authority to consider its arguments on appeal. 
Alternatively, Mr. Petersen respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district 
courts orders suppressing all the evidence found as the fruit of an illegal search and 
dismissing the charge of money laundering. 
DATED this 28th day of March, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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